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In Communist Propaganda

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2 APRIL 1975

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INDOCHINA

PRG HAILS MILITARY ADVANCES, RENEWS OFFER FOR TALKS

The fast-changing battlefield situation in South Vietnam has been promptly hailed in authoritative comment in Vietnamese communist media but has elicited no major departures in propaganda lines established prior to the widespread communist takeover of GVN territory. Reiterations of demands that Thieu be removed so that negotiations can be held appeared in two official documents--a 28 March communique, issued by a joint conference of the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the PRG Advisory Council, and a joint appeal of the NFLSV Central Committee and the PRG.

The PRG communique showed particular concern about communist capacity to effectively provide for the vast new population now under its control, and it called for foreign assistance to cope with the problem. The flood of high-level pronouncements on the fighting has included a PLAF Command communique of the 30th exulting in the fall of Quang Nam Province and Danang and an appeal from the PLAF Command on the same date that made a direct pitch to the Saigon soldiers to desert.

PRG CONFERENCE, APPEAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AID

The content of the 28 March joint communique, released after a "recent" conference of the PRG Advisory Council and the PRG, presided over by the Advisory Council Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, suggests that the meeting was called on an emergency basis to deal with unanticipated problems that have resulted from the sudden expansion of communist control in the South. While there have been ceremonial occasions in the past when the Advisory Council has been jointly convened with the PRG and other governmental bodies--most notably in September 1969 following Ho Chi Minh's death when it met with the NFLSV Central Committee, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Alliance, and the PRG, it has not been previously known to have met exclusively with the PRG. Provision for just such a conference was contained in the June 1969 resolution of the Congress of National Delegates of South Vietnam that established the PRG. In defining the functions of the Advisory Council, the resolution noted, "In case it is necessary to make major decisions on important problems of the country, joint conferences between the PRG and the Advisory Council will be held."

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Following a brief appraisal of the "current very great victories of the southern revolution" and a claim that they mark a "strategically significant turning point throughout all of South Vietnam" and the "enemy's . . . disintegration," the communique cryptically acknowledged that the conference had discussed and "decided upon urgent measures to quickly stabilize the situation" in captured areas, especially in the cities. The communique referred to the "millions of people who have just escaped . . . and who are now living in the PRG-controlled areas," and it said the conference had issued a call to governments of various countries and international and national organizations to "increase their assistance to the PRG in alleviating the difficulties and misery" facing these people. Despite the magnitude of the problem involved in caring for the people in newly captured territory, the communique discouraged the populace from fleeing with the GVN forces and denounced the United States and Thieu for allegedly forcing them to evacuate from areas about to fall, calling upon them to return and help "stabilize life."

The communique explicitly cited and reaffirmed PRG statements of 8 October 1974 and 21 March 1975 in demanding an end to U.S. "involvement and interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam" and the toppling of the "Thieu clique" to make way for an administration "truly desiring peace, independence, democracy and national concord" which would "scrupulously" implement the Paris agreement. Echoing the earlier government statements, the communique reaffirmed that "The PRG stands ready to talk with such an administration to quickly solve the problems of South Vietnam." While low-level comment as early as August 1974 had revived the call for Thieu's ouster, the 8 October statement gave the demand for his ouster and the offer of negotiations official sanction.*

**JOINT APPEAL
FROM NFLSV/PRG** The 29 March joint appeal "to southern compatriots and combatants" issued by the NFLSV and PRG repeated the same demands and offer of negotiations but without reference to either of the earlier PRG statements. The appeal seemed to be mainly an expression of gratitude to the communist forces in the South for successfully accomplishing their missions and an attempt to urge them "to move forward to win further

* For a discussion of the 8 October and 21 March PRG statements, see the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 11-13, and 26 March 1975, pages 6-10, respectively.

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and yet greater victories." While it did characterize the action of the "armed forces and people on all battlefields" as providing "due punishment to the Thieu clique for its criminal acts of continuing the war and sabotaging the Paris agreement," it failed to mention the 15 October 1973 PLAF Command order, which had in effect announced a policy of offensive action by declaring that GVN attacks would be met by "counterattacks". The 15 October order had been cited in an 11 March PRG Foreign Ministry statement justifying the communist attack on Ban Me Thuot, and an editorial in the PLAF journal QUAN GIAI PHONG broadcast by Liberation Radio on 29 March described the current fighting as "attacking the enemy at any place and at any time as called for by the 15 October 1973 order."

In reciting the extent of the military successes in the South, the appeal jubilantly boasted that this was a "very great strategic victory which marks a new turn in the southern situation and confirms that the situation is irreversible." The appeal conveyed "the warmest congratulations to the "compatriots and cadres and combatants of the PLAF" and "greatly rejoiced" at the "brilliant overall achievements of the beloved North which has . . . been looking after the kith-and-kin South."

CAPTURE OF DANANG

The issuance of the 30 March PLAF Command communique on the "liberation" of Quang Nam

Province and Danang follows a pattern established after the communist capture of the Central Highlands and Hue when similar PLAF Command communique were released. The latest communique described the communist advances into Danang city, claiming that their artillery "controlled" the enemy bases "right from the first minute." A Liberation Radio account of the 29th that told of the Danang fighting while it was still in progress was more specific, declaring that the "liberation artillery units have violently shelled the airfields, the docks, and the mouth of the Hang River." According to the communique, communist forces took "complete control" of the city at 1500 hours on the 29th, and it claimed that those who had been "forced by the enemy to flee" had returned by the "hundreds of thousands . . . carrying flags to welcome the PLAF" and that "tens of thousands of puppet troops, officers, and civil servants . . . have returned to the people."

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Initial media reports on life in Danang after its capture attempted to portray a "return to normal," with accounts of public utilities being maintained and the reopening of shops and markets. A 31 March Liberation Radio broadcast even noted that the Danang teachers were making "urgent preparations" to reopen the schools. A 2 April Hanoi radio account of an appeal issued by the Danang city "revolutionary committee," suggested, however, that a less than normal situation now prevails in the city. The appeal urged the populace and soldiers to "satisfactorily carry out the task of defending and consolidating the city in every aspect" and asked that vigilance be heightened. While not directly admitting a lack of public order or the existence of violent opposition to the communist authorities, such an implication was clear in the appeal's call for the PLAF to "hold their guns firm day and night and stand ready to defend the city" and for everyone to cooperate in maintaining public order and security and in "rapidly stabilizing all activities."

CALL FOR ARVN
DESERTIONS

Apparently as a supplement to the 25 March PRG statement which urged people under the GVN administration to transfer their allegiance to the PRG, the PLAF Command on 30 March issued a separate appeal directed at GVN military personnel. The PLAF appeal called on GVN soldiers to respond to the 25 March statement's seven-point policy and asked them "to clearly realize the situation and act quickly so as to avoid the same bitter, ignominious fate of the Thieu clique."* The appeal's presentation was explicit and to the point. It asserted that those who hesitate or remain undecided would be committing "crimes against the fatherland and inviting catastrophe on themselves." It bluntly exhorted ARVN personnel to desert and rejoin their families and told them not to flee with the retreating GVN forces nor to continue to oppose the PLAF. The appeal made the plea that GVN war materiel not be destroyed and specifically requested that aircraft and warships be brought over to the "liberated zones."

* The PRG statement containing the seven-point policy is discussed in the TRENDS of 26 March 1975, pages 6-10.

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PRG, HANOI STATEMENT'S PROTEST U.S. EFFORTS IN VIETNAM

U.S. efforts to evacuate the Danang refugees and to resupply the GVN have evoked a welter of PRG and Hanoi protest statements. These have included the rarely used format of a government spokesman's statement issued by the PRG on 30 March and a DRV Foreign Ministry statement of the same date, objecting to President Ford's order dispatching U.S. naval vessels to the Danang area for the evacuation. Protests against U.S. attempts to resupply the GVN through airlifts from the United States and Thailand have been registered at the less authoritative level of foreign ministry spokesmen statements. Similarly, remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Philip Habib at a 1 April press conference drew a PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 2d that charged him with "distorting the just struggle of the South Vietnamese people and slanderously accusing the DRV of violating the Paris agreement."

REACTION TO U.S. EVACUATION EFFORTS U.S. efforts to help transfer GVN refugees from Danang prompted high-level PRG and Hanoi reaction that was strongly disapproving. The 30 March PRG spokesman's statement--the first PRG use of this authoritative format since a protest at the same level was issued in May 1974 on the controversy over the shelling of the Cai Lay primary school in My Tho Province*--declared the President Ford's 29 March order to send U.S. vessels into South Vietnam's "territorial waters" under the "label of a humanitarian evacuation" constituted a "serious violation" of the Paris agreement and a "gross encroachment" of South Vietnamese rights of self-determination. The statement characterized the U.S. move as an attempt to restore GVN morale and salvage ARVN forces to "drag on the war." It also strongly objected to what it termed U.S. efforts to bring other countries in on the evacuation, citing the unspecified "action" of the British Government as "altogether wrong." Noting that vessels entering PRG territorial airspace and waters must have prior PRG permission, the statement contended that the PRG would tolerate no violation of this principle but failed to indicate what means of enforcement it might employ.

* Although VINA transmissions identified the latest statement as originating with the spokesman of the PRG Foreign Ministry, Liberation Radio, LPA, and Hanoi radio all attributed it to the "spokesman for the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam."

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Hanoi's support for the PRG protest came in a 30 March DRV Foreign Ministry statement that described Ford's decision to deploy U.S. naval vessels for the Danang evacuation as "a very grave violation of the Paris agreement." The Foreign Ministry statement reiterated the essential points of the PRG spokesman's statement and additionally complained of General Weyand's presence in Saigon and the alleged "airlift" between Thailand and Saigon as "proof" that the United States refuses to end its "military involvement" in South Vietnam. The DRV Foreign Ministry statement also charged that some 20 years ago the United States had "wrecked the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam and this had driven it into the "bloodiest, costliest, longest, and hardest war ever recorded in U.S. history." Professing "full support" for the PRG spokesman's statement, the DRV statement concluded with the demand that the U.S. ships be removed from South Vietnam and that the United States observe the Paris agreement and the 13 June 1973 joint communique on the implementation of the Paris accord.

Citing Western news agency reports of Philippine and Taiwan vessels being sent to Danang to help in the evacuation, the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman on 27 March issued a statement "vehemently condemning" these actions and reminding the two countries that "they would be directly involved in the crime . . . of forced relocation of the South Vietnamese people." A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement of the 28th also "sternly condemned" the Philippine "authorities" for sending navy vessels to Danang, but without mentioning any participation by Taiwan or citing Western news agencies as the basis of its information. The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement also condemned Thai "authorities" for "continuing to allow" the United States to airlift war materiel to Phnom Penh, noting the "inconsistency" of this action with their statement demanding a U.S. withdrawal of military forces from Thailand.

COMMENT ON U.S. AIRLIFT The U.S. airlift of supplies that began arriving in South Vietnam on 1 April drew swift protest in foreign ministry spokesmen statements on the same day from both the PRG and DRV, assailing an alleged "new act" by the Ford Administration aimed at "reassuring the puppet army and administration which are disintegrating and collapsing." The PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement "severely condemned" the U.S. action and demanded that it be suspended immediately. A Hanoi radio report of the 1st on the supporting DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement--the text of which is not yet available--noted the DRV's "full support" for the PRG protest.

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The PRG and Hanoi also issued foreign ministry spokesmen statements on 29 March to complain of what they described as an emergency U.S. airlift of supplies to Saigon from Thailand. According to the PRG charges, the airlift was initiated in accordance with a proposal from General Weyand and was a "violation" of the Paris agreement. The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman took the same tack as the PRG but also pointed out that the airlift showed that the Thai authorities "continue to allow the United States to use Thai territory as a 'base to oppose the Vietnamese people."

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PRC LAUDS PLAF ATTACKS, SEES "DIFFERENCES" AMONG U.S. LEADERS

Peking media have welcomed the "great victories" of the communists in South Vietnam and endorsed the Vietnamese communist contention that their attacks are a justified response to violations of the Paris agreement by the Thieu government. The only authoritative Chinese comment to date was offered in a 30 March PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the communist military advances in South Vietnam.* The only other PRC comment was in a 1 April Peking radio commentary which contained an unusual discussion of "differences" among U.S. leaders over Indochina policy. The level of the Chinese comment is in accord with Peking's consistently restrained treatment of developments in Indochina since the withdrawal of U.S. forces under the January 1973 Paris agreement.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article recited the territory captured by the communists in South Vietnam, extended congratulations on these "great victories," and argued that communist "counterattacks" against Saigon troops were "both justified and completely proper." In attempting to defend the communist military actions, the article was harsher in its criticism of the GVN than the last previous Commentator article on 15 October, charging that Thieu had embarked on an effort to "wipe out" the PRG and that his "crime" in undermining the Paris accord is "undeniable." The current Commentator article did not repeat the Vietnamese communist demand for Thieu's removal, although the 15 October article had cited the call for his removal in the 8 October PRG statement which it endorsed.

In assessing the importance of the communist advances, the Commentator claimed that their "victories" had dealt a "heavy blow" to Saigon and that the morale of GVN troops had "sunk to a new low." The 1 April Peking radio commentary went further in lauding the communists' success, stating that the victories are of "great strategic and political significance," citing Western press comment comparing the situation to the 1954 battle at Dien Bien Phu, and claiming that the Thieu regime's situation is "beyond hope." Such positive comment contrasts markedly with Peking's much more cautious appraisal of

* The last authoritative Chinese comment pegged to Vietnam developments was in a 15 October 1974 PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article endorsing the PRG's 8 October government statement. The article is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 October 1974, page 10.

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Vietnamese communist military battle gains during the 1972 offensive, when the Chinese went so far as to drop the most optimistic Vietnamese communist assessments of their military achievements when replaying Hanoi and PRG comment.

While continuing Peking's usual practice in avoiding reference directly to President Ford and his Administration, the Commentator article pressed for the United States not only to honor the Paris agreement but also to fulfill an "obligation" to have the Thieu regime strictly implement the accord. It cited specific U.S. actions to demonstrate Washington's failure in this regard, including the provision of additional military aid to Saigon, General Weyand's consultations in Saigon, and the dispatch of U.S. ships to waters near South Vietnam to "intimidate" the Vietnamese. No such specific indictment of U.S. actions had been included in the October 1974 Commentator article.

"DIFFERENCES" AMONG
U.S. LEADERS

The 1 April Peking radio assessment of U.S. policy in Indochina routinely pointed out that the Administration "has not learned the lesson" from its defeats and is still trying to aid Saigon and Phnom Penh, but it added an unusual reference to division among U.S. leaders over policy there. It noted that the Administration's efforts for further aid are not only opposed by the "American people" but also by "quite a few people in the U.S. ruling clique." It specified two separate positions held by these people, claiming that some want to get out of Indochina because of the futility of further involvement there, while others are concerned that heavy U.S. involvement in the "secondary" concern of Indochina weakens the U.S. global posture vis-a-vis Moscow and undercuts Washington's position in its "primary" area of concern, Europe.

The radio commentary avoided specific endorsement of either position, though concurrent Chinese reportage has suggested PRC support for a U.S. pullback from Indochina and a fostering of resources to be used against Moscow in Europe. This was most recently pointed up in a 25 March NCNA report of Secretary Schlesinger's remarks before Congress and during an interview with the Philadelphia BULLETIN, which played up his stress that the American military focus must now shift mainly to Europe in order to fend off recent Soviet advances there. The 1 April radio commentary said that the current "differences and contradictions" in the U.S. leadership not only reflect U.S. "helplessness" before the communist military advances in Indochina but show the "awkward situation of the U.S. ruling clique" in trying to maintain an overextended position abroad in contending with the USSR for "world hegemony."

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MOSCOW VOICES ROUTINE SUPPORT FOR "RETALIATORY" PRG ACTION

Soviet media have continued to cite both Vietnamese communist and Western news reports on the situation in South Vietnam describing the ARVN position as being virtually hopeless. Commentators have argued that the military action by the South Vietnamese "patriots" is justified retaliation to continued violations of the Paris agreement by the Saigon regime. On 2 April TASS cited Western news agencies as predicting the "inevitable resignation" of the Thieu regime, and Soviet media have noted that the 21 March PRG statement reiterated willingness to negotiate with a new Saigon government to "speedily settle all the problems in South Vietnam."

Most of the comment adheres closely to a major 16 January PRAVDA article by Yuriy Zhukov, pegged to the capture earlier that month of Phuoc Binh, in stressing the "retaliatory" nature of the communists' military sweep.* A 31 March broadcast by Soviet military commentator Col. Aleksey Leontyev cited Thieu's refusal to recognize the PRG and move toward a coalition government as well as his "raids" on the liberated zone as actions which provoked communist retaliation. Calling Saigon's military setbacks "disastrous," Leontyev said that the "agony" would only be prolonged if Thieu's "overseas supporters" increased military aid to keep Thieu "afloat." In this connection, a 28 March TASS commentary by Kiselev cited Japanese and other Asian press comment as expressing apprehension that "Pentagon strategists" were planning "new military ventures" in Vietnam to save the Saigon regime but concluded that American assistance, "whatever the form," could not save Thieu.

A TASS report of Secretary Kissinger's 26 March press conference published in PRAVDA on the 28th, said cryptically that he "insisted on the continuation of U.S. military supplies to the Saigon regime." And it added that the Secretary "justified this unpopular policy" by referring to 15 years of U.S. support for Vietnam.

* Zhukov had also stressed that the Paris agreement had envisaged a political settlement as well as the withdrawal of U.S. forces. See the TRENDS of 22 January 1975, pages 21-22.

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CAMBODIAN FRONT STANCE REMAINS HARD AS LON NOL DEPARTS

The Cambodian insurgent Front (NUFC) has remained impervious to appeals for negotiations with Phnom Penh despite recent GKR cabinet changes and the departure of President Lon Nol. Prince Sihanouk categorically rejected calls for compromise from GKR Deputy Prime Minister Pan Sothi in a statement on 31 March and Front military chief and RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan reaffirmed determination to achieve total military defeat of Phnom Penh in a statement on 1 April. Peking, Hanoi and Moscow have all portrayed the departure of Lon Nol as an indication of inevitable victory for the Front.

Sihanouk's 31 March statement, as reported by NCNA, charged that Lon Nol's departure and replacement by GKR Acting President Saukham Khoy was "a new political plot" by the United States to prevent the loss of Cambodia, and it rejected appeals for negotiations by GKR Deputy Prime Minister Pan Sothi as "a dirty and vulgar trap of U.S. imperialism." Sihanouk proclaimed that "on no account, under no circumstances, neither in the near future nor in the more remote future" would the Front agree to reconciliation with "the traitors in the clique of Saukham Khoy, Pan Sothi and company." Earlier, in a 26 March statement, carried by AKI on 1 April, Sihanouk had rejected appeals for negotiations by GKR Premier Long Boret. In that statement he also named Saukham Khoy, Pan Sothi, and several others as "true war criminals" who would have to "answer before state justice for their innumerable evil deeds," suggesting that the Front may expand the number of those who would face Front retribution beyond the "seven traitors" marked for elimination at the Front congress in February. Predicting military victory "in the near future," Sihanouk declared in his 31 March statement that the Front would continue to fight "U.S. imperialism and its valets in the spirit of no retreat or compromise until they are eliminated totally, definitively, and irreversibly" from Cambodian soil.

Khieu Samphan utilized the departure of Lon Nol to urge defection to the Front in an appeal broadcast on 1 April by the Voice of the NUFC of Phnom Penh. Warning that "the seven traitors have forsaken you," Khieu Samphan renewed earlier Front offers of pardon and participation in the Front to all civil and military authorities of the Phnom Penh regime who would cease resistance immediately. He also echoed Sihanouk's tough stance on negotiations, warned that the "seven traitors" would attempt to prolong the war even after leaving Phnom Penh "by appointing this man or that man" to seek negotiations with the Front, and reaffirmed Front determination to reject all such "maneuvers."

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FOREIGN SUPPORT Reporting on the departure of Lon Nol in an NCNA dispatch of 1 April, Peking noted that continuing victories by the Front are "hastening the doom" of the Phnom Penh government. It declared that nothing can save the Phnom Penh regime, "no matter what tricks its supporter the United States may play in connection with the flight of Lon Nol." Hanoi commented on Lon Nol's departure in a 2 April NHAN DAN commentary which said he left in the midst of the "irretrievable collapse" of the Phnom Penh government. NHAN DAN scored alleged continued U.S. interference in Cambodian internal affairs, stating that U.S. obstinacy is only "fanning the indignation of the Cambodian people and inviting stronger condemnation from the world public."

Soviet political observer Viktor Shragin on Radio Moscow on 1 April called Lon Nol "a political bankrupt in flight" and stated that alleged plans by the United States to "reshuffle Phnom Penh" in hopes of negotiations "lack realism" in view of the Phnom Penh's "crumbling" military position. Noting U.S. Administration efforts to procure additional aid commitments from Congress, Shragin stated that with added aid it is possible to prolong Phnom Penh's existence but impossible to save it.

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW IMPLIES U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN KING FAYSAL'S SLAYING

Soviet media treatment of the 25 March assassination of Saudi Arabia's King Faysal by his nephew appears designed to stimulate suspicions of U.S. intentions in the Middle East by insinuating, through use of heavy innuendo and selective citations from foreign news stories, that the United States and its Central Intelligence Agency were involved in the killing. To reinforce the notion of U.S. complicity, Soviet media have emphasized the theme of recent U.S.-Saudi Arabian discord and have recalled public "threats" by U.S. official sources in recent months against the Arab oil producers, while asking, as in a PRAVDA article by Vladimir Peresada on the 31st, whether the threats are beginning to be implemented. Moscow's implicit suggestions that the CIA may have been involved in the slaying are possibly intended also to capitalize on recent Western press reports alleging CIA consideration in the past of plans to assassinate certain foreign leaders.

U.S. MOTIVES Moscow's initial reaction to the assassination was confined to brief summaries by TASS and Moscow domestic radio of Riyadh radio reports on the event. On the 26th, Soviet media began to cull and replay speculations from the Arab and Western press on the circumstances and consequences of the killing. The theme emphasized in the selections was that King Faysal's murder was a politically motivated act backed by a foreign power, and it was accompanied by strong implications that the United States would gain the most, politically and economically, from King Faysal's removal. A logical inconsistency was apparent, however, in Moscow's early attempts to construct a rationale for U.S. involvement in his death. Gennadiy Vedenyapin, in his Moscow domestic radio "International Diary" program on the 26th, reflected the contradiction when he asserted that, although the Western press was speculating on the possible changes King Faysal's death could bring to Saudi Arabia's policy--"which has traditionally had a pro-American orientation"--the consensus of political observers was that the assassination "will not in fact change anything in that country's foreign policy."

Subsequent Soviet treatment, continuing to cite foreign news sources, has sought to suggest plausible U.S. motives for wanting King Faysal killed. To this end, Soviet coverage has emphasized a theme of recent U.S.-Saudi Arabian policy disputes, said to have occurred

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since the October 1973 Arab oil embargo, and has referred to the economic and political advantages their favorable resolution would bring to the United States. The policy disputes cited include Riyadh's decisions to reduce oil production, increase oil prices, terminate Saudi Arabian currency ties to the U.S. dollar, nationalize the ARAMCO oil company, and continue substantial support to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab states in their conflict with Israel.

TASS on the 27th, for instance, in a series of dispatches from Arab capitals cited Arab press items to the effect that although King Faysal had been a longtime U.S. ally, mutual disenchantment had recently developed in U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations. TASS' account of an article in Beirut's AL-LIWA' alleged that whereas the King had become "disappointed with U.S. politics [policy]" following Secretary Kissinger's Mideast mission earlier in the month, the United States had in turn been angered by the King's oil policies, in particular, and had become "convinced it was impossible to achieve a reduction of oil prices during Faysal's lifetime." TASS also quoted the Rabat L'OPINION's characterization of the assassination as "to the advantage of imperialist and Zionist agents," as well as the same newspaper's statement that "the events in Chile and Cyprus give sufficient idea as to who masterminded the crime."

In attempting to draw a picture of potential U.S. advantages from King Faysal's death, Soviet media have generally focused on U.S. interest in Saudi Arabian oil. Moscow radio's Arabic service on the 27th, for example, citing the Washington POST, characterized as "a fatal blow" to U.S. interests Saudi Arabia's decision announced at the OPEC conference in Algiers on 6 March to reduce oil production. The broadcast continued that King Faysal's death "will escalate the intrigues of the U.S. oil monopolies," such as ARAMCO which, "the press says," "always plays a central role in these intrigues." On 1 April another Moscow radio commentary in Arabic developed similar charges, initiating the broadcast with the rhetorical question, "Who directed the assassination of King Faysal?" The commentary noted recent Saudi Arabian oil policy decisions, including the progressive nationalization of ARAMCO, and stressed that "naturally, such aspects of King Faysal's policy did not please the ARAMCO bosses and aggressive imperialist quarters that back them."

U.S. ROLE Although offering little original comment of its own, Moscow has strongly implied direct U.S. involvement in King Faysal's death. A striking example of Moscow's accusation

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was Vladimir Peresada's article in PRAVDA on the 31st, presently unavailable in Washington. As reported by TASS, the article asserted that there were grounds for speculating whether the assassination might not have been a political act unrelated to internal Saudi Arabian differences.* The article supported this thesis in contending that King Faysal's recent policies, particularly on oil questions, had "caused displeasure and irritation beyond the ocean." Peresada cited "foreign commentators" as wondering whether the U.S. CIA might have been involved, noting that although these commentators "do not have at their disposal specific information so far," they nonetheless remember U.S. "threats" made in the recent past against Arab oil-producers--"specifically threats of applying some 'sanctions' to 'recalcitrant' leaders. Has such a threat been carried out in al-Riyadh?" Peresada asked. Similarly, PRAVDA the day before had carried a Tomas Kolesnichenko article that asked, "Are not the long arms of the CIA involved in the shots in Riyadh?--that is the question many observers are asking today."

Other examples of Moscow's insinuations of U.S. complicity in King Faysal's death include an unattributed commentary by Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic on the 27th which, while repeating the same type of foreign press speculations carried by the Soviet press, TASS and Moscow radio, offered some original comment--including the observation, "We believe that such conjectures may not be quite divorced from reality." To support its belief, the commentary referred to assertions in the Lebanese BAYRUT that the United States had recently "again been threatening armed intervention against the oil-producing Arab states and attempting to strike at the national liberation movement in the southern Arabian peninsula and to disrupt the unity of the Arab states 'confronting Israel.' Along similar lines, Moscow radio in Persian on the 28th, citing an IZVESTIYA article, noted that foreign press speculation on the assassination and its consequences had centered on the importance of Saudi Arabian oil. Recalling that the U.S. magazine NEWSWEEK at the end of last year had published an article

* Moscow has left unexplored the question of the potential implications of King Faysal's death for Saudi Arabia's domestic politics and internal political stability. The Peresada reference to this issue was not further explained in the TASS report. PRAVDA's "International Review" by Tomas Kolesnichenko on the 30th, however, had cited the "opinion of certain observers" that the killing "signifies the end of stability in Saudi Arabia itself, where a power struggle has already begun among approximately 3,000 Saudi emirs, including 36 sons of the founder of the dynasty 'Abd al-Aziz."

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outlining various types of pressures the United States might exert against the Arab oil-producers, the broadcast concluded with a question as to whether such threats were "now being carried out."

The NEWSWEEK reference was repeated on 1 April in a Moscow radio commentary in Arabic. The broadcast asserted that the Arab press was recalling that

"NEWSWEEK, mouthpiece of leading American economic interests, last autumn expounded three possible ways of solving the oil problem. These were psychological warfare against the Arab countries, the assassination of kings and princes of the oil states, or the occupation of their oilfields. In fact, the magazine fixed the date of implementation of such operations for the spring of 1975."

In the 7 October NEWSWEEK article, the reference to spring of 1975 appeared when the magazine cited the opinion of "some who think that the industrialized nations may be in such desperate straits as early as next spring that an invasion would be thinkable." The rest of the Moscow radio summary was generally accurate, although the context was highly compressed and NEWSWEEK's cautions that any of the "options" presented would almost certainly prove counter-productive were omitted.

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U. S. - PRC RELATIONS

PEKING CRITICIZES U.S. STANCE OVER CANCELED TROUPE VISIT

Peking has taken public issue with the Administration's refusal to allow a Chinese entertainment troupe to present a song about the liberation of Taiwan during its planned tour of the United States--a position which led to the cancellation of the troupe's visit--but at the same time has declared its continued interest in promoting Sino-American contacts. NCNA on 2 April publicized a statement by the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the spokesman of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry which directly charged the United States with taking an "unwarranted" stand contravening the "spirit" of the Shanghai communique and incompatible with the "principle" that Taiwan's liberation is an internal Chinese affair.

The statement represents the first authoritative Chinese criticism of U.S. policy over the sensitive Taiwan issue since President Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking, and appears designed to counteract any impressions in China or abroad that Peking will acquiesce to the U.S. Taiwan stance. However, while the statement reaffirmed Peking's determination to protect the "principle" of Taiwan's liberation, it directed only mildly worded criticism at Washington, avoiding all reference to U.S. officials, and reaffirming Peking's resolve to abide by the Shanghai communique and promote bilateral contracts.

Peking claimed that the U.S. demand for the deletion of the controversial song was "entirely groundless" and that "no fault can be found" with the Chinese troupe for including a song about Taiwan's liberation--the Chinese people's "internal affair, in which no other country has the right to interfere." The statement acknowledged that the song had not been included in the original Chinese program submitted to the United States, but claimed that it was contained in a "supplementary list." Declaring incorrectly that the U.S. Government had "agreed" in the Shanghai communique that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China," the statement asserted that Washington's objection to the song indicates that it was "retreating from the Shanghai communique." The U.S. position as stated in the communique actually reads: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."

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While focusing public attention on the cancellation of the tour, the statement concluded on an upbeat note of Chinese "active support" for continued contacts with the United States. It reaffirmed Chinese determination to abide by the Shanghai communique and noted that Peking is eager to promote Sino-U.S. contacts in order to enhance "mutual understanding and friendship." Peking had earlier underscored this point following the announced cancellation of the entertainment troupe's visit when a 31 March NCNA report on the closing of the Chinese archaeological exhibit in Washington played up the fact that unprecedented numbers of visitors had seen the show, including Mrs. Ford and Secretary Kissinger, and that it had served to enhance ties between the two peoples. Peking also gave its usual high-level attention to the U.S. Congressional delegation led by Carl Albert and John Rhodes currently visiting China, noting that the Americans had held talks with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on 1 April and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua on 31 March.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW NOTES ANNIVERSARY OF PEACE PROGRAM, SEES HOPEFUL TRENDS

Moscow has continued in routine propaganda to profess commitment to the further positive development of U.S.-Soviet relations. The latest peg for such optimistic comment was the fourth anniversary of the 24th CPSU congress, which adopted the "peace program." IZVESTIYA celebrated the event on 29 April, but PRAVDA has not yet observed it. Along with this, Moscow has maintained an attentive posture toward U.S. developments affecting trade policy, indicating a willingness to respond favorably, when and if the present restrictive features in U.S. legislation are removed. At the same time, Moscow has not neglected to draw attention to developments reflecting negatively on the United States, particularly charges against the CIA.

DETENTE The detente theme was strongly accented in a front-page editorial article in IZVESTIYA on 29 March devoted to the anniversary of the 24th CPSU Congress. Describing the peace program adopted by the congress as the "axis around which international life is now developing," it called for renewed struggle "every day and every hour" to insure its success. Referring to the United States, it said that a "drastic positive shift has come about in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States," implying by the use of the past tense that the shift is a permanent one. In a broader vein, it claimed that the efforts of all concerned in implementing the peace program had been "crowned with major successes," indicating, without specifically stating as much, that the U.S.-Soviet agreements of 1972 were among these successes.

Among the other central newspapers whose late March issues are available, AGRICULTURAL LIFE carried an editorial on the anniversary. PRAVDA has not yet observed the occasion, but it may do so at the end of the anniversary period.

Other reiterations of the detente theme in recent weeks have included references to Brezhnev's remark at the Hungarian party congress that the Soviet Union "pays serious attention" to the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations. A more ringing declaration by Brezhnev--his statement at the Polish Sejm last year that the way to achieve peace is to "pursue a policy of peace and fight for this policy"--was quoted by Kirilenko in his speech to the Italian party congress on 19 March.

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TRADE Moscow continues to profess readiness to trade with the United States, while hinting at the possibility of giving preferential treatment to Western Europe and Japan, and continuing to criticize the U.S. Congress and specific congressmen for the recent trade legislation, which it regards as discriminatory. An article in SOVIET RUSSIA on 27 March, for example, played all these themes. Stressing the great importance of trade as an element of international cooperation, the article compared the expansion of Soviet trade with France, the FRG, and the UK with what it described as the "artificially narrowed" trade with the United States. It identified Senator Jackson and Representative Vanik as being to blame for this situation, but it referred to the affair as a past episode, seemingly leaving the door open for a new start whenever the United States was ready. Other commentaries in recent weeks touching on one or more of these themes have included a Yuriy Zhukov television program on the 9th, a Grigoryants NEDELYA article on the 13th, and a Turkatenko commentary to North America on the 29th. The Zhukov program was notable for citing letters from viewers who expressed concern about various hidden dangers and disadvantages supposedly attending trade with capitalists. One reader wondered whether the credit arrangements wouldn't redound only to the advantage of the capitalists. Another wondered about the economic penetration involved in allowing Western banks to open offices in Moscow. It seems a fair assumption that these concerns would not be aired and answered on Moscow television unless fairly high level authorities believed that important segments of public or official opinion held these views.

CIA Among Soviet replays of Western news items reflecting negatively on the United States, principal attention was devoted to charges against the CIA, particularly the accusation that it had been responsible for the assassinations of foreign leaders. President Ford's statement in his South Bend news conference on 19 March that the accusation would be investigated provided the peg for several Soviet comments. Even earlier, an article by V. Chernayavskiy in NEW TIMES on 14 March ridiculed the assertions of former CIA officials that covert activities constitute only a small percentage of the CIA's work. "The flywheel of the U.S. intelligence machine would immediately stop without secret agents, saboteurs, and the subversive actions of its masters," the article declared.

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Another U.S.-originated item picked up by Moscow and used as a basis for criticism was a February report of the Center for Defense Information detailing the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons and asserting that a high proportion of them were maintained outside the borders of the United States--on the high seas or in foreign lands. Dilating on the dangers posed by this situation, a Radio Peace and Progress program to Asia came up with a new version of the "mad pilot" scenario. "Any slight miscalculation or criminal negligence of the servicing personnel of the ships, to say nothing of intentional provocations, could mean annihilation"

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ROMANIA

CEAUSESCU RESPONDS TO BLOC CRITICISM WITH NATIONALIST SPEECH

Seemingly responding to criticism at the recent Hungarian party congress, Romanian party-state leader Ceausescu in a 28 March speech to the party academy vehemently denied that Romania's assertion of its national interests is "anti-communist." Ceausescu's defense of "national communism" came on the heels of a 20 March speech by Hungarian Politburo member Dezso Nemes in which he declared that bloc countries that fail to ally themselves closely with Moscow are fertile ground for anti-Sovietism. Romania seemed also to be the target of the congress resolution's call for communist parties to close ranks and to oppose "chauvinist, nationalist and anti-Soviet concepts."

Ceausescu's remarks, published in the 29 March SCINTEIA, rejected any link between national communism and anti-communism. He criticized "some people" who deny or fail to appreciate the role of nations and who equate national interests with "nationalism" and "anti-communism." In his congress speech, Nemes had stopped short of using the term "anti-communist," but he came close in stating that the "leadership of a workers party or government in a socialist country" can easily become the "puppet" of "anti-Soviet forces and imperialist maneuvers" if it rejects close ties with Moscow or harbors "open or concealed anti-Sovietism." Following Ceausescu's speech Nemes expanded on this theme in a 1 April IZVESTIYA article, charging that bourgeois ideology aims to "loosen up" the unity of the bloc countries by disseminating rumors concerning "so-called differences" among them and by concentrating on Peking's anti-Sovietism and the "vestiges of petit bourgeois nationalist ideology in the socialist countries."

Obviously taking aim at such hard-line critics of national communism, Ceausescu warned that any effort to label "progressive and democratic" ideas or sincere criticism as anti-communist can be harmful to the communist movement, leading not only to a weakening of good relations among nations but also to a strengthening of "real anti-communism." He went on to assert that nations will continue to play an important role not only in the current stage of socialist development but even after communism replaces socialism. Ceausescu also seemed to be championing the role of the smaller independent nations as against the superpowers when he contended that the solutions to major international issues must be found by individual peoples rather than by certain "personalities" or the "goodwill of some governments."

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SOVIET BLOC LEADERS' MEETING: Romania's isolation was underscored by a meeting in Budapest of Brezhnev and the top party leaders of Moscow's five orthodox East European allies on the second day of the 17-22 March Hungarian party congress. Since Romania was represented at the congress by a second-level party figure, Verdet, he would not have been expected to attend. The last occasion when the top bloc party leaders met was the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting in the Polish capital in April 1974 where, of course, RCP General Secretary Ceausescu was in attendance. The customary mid-summer gathering in the Crimea of bloc leaders--including Ceausescu--was not held in 1974. The TASS and MTI reports on the 18 March Budapest meeting said that, among other things, current problems of the world communist movement were discussed in a "sincere and cordial" atmosphere with complete unanimity on all questions. Reports and comment on the meeting, including PRAVDA's 23 March editorial on the Hungarian congress, avoided any mention of the projected all-European and world communist party conferences--gatherings which were endorsed in the orthodox party leaders' speeches at the Hungarian congress. While the Romanians, like the Yugoslavs, have so far participated in preparations for the European communist parties conference, both countries have avoided committing themselves to attend the final conference, fearing that Moscow intends to use that gathering as a stepping stone to a world party conference and to use both conclaves as forums for attacking Peking.

SINO-JAPANESE TREATY IMPASSE: In the face of the impasse in the four-month old Peking-Tokyo talks on a peace treaty, Peking has underscored the importance it attaches to the inclusion of a controversial anti-hegemony clause. The clause, which appeared in the 1972 Japan-PRC joint communique establishing diplomatic relations, declares opposition to any attempts to secure hegemony in Asia not only by the two signatories, but by "any other country" as well. Reporting the debate on the issue in Japan, NCNA on 2 April quoted an LDP member as declaring that it is "natural and right" that the peace treaty include opposition to hegemony in Asia by Japan, China, or "any other country or group of countries," and urging the Japanese government to "take the initiative to request the inclusion of this in the treaty." Similarly, NCNA on 31 March had quoted a Japanese

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speaker on the issue as having stated that it is "absolutely necessary to state clearly" such language in the peace treaty. At the same time, Moscow has cautioned Japan to avoid being drawn into Peking's anti-Soviet snares on the issue. For example, an article in issue No. 10 of the Soviet weekly NEW TIMES warned Japan that by establishing closer relations with China on a "platform which affects the interests of other countries," it would be "partly to blame" for any "adverse consequences" of Peking's stand on a variety of issues ranging from detente and disarmament to international economic cooperation. NEW TIMES also warned that promotion of Japanese-Chinese relations "in any way detrimental to Soviet interests may be taken into account by the Soviet Union in its relations with Japan."

DEATH OF BURMESE CP LEADERS: The deaths of Burmese Communist Party Chairman Thakin Zin and Secretary Thakin Chit, killed during a mid-March government raid on Burmese CP headquarters in the Pegu Yoma mountain area, according to a 20 March Rangoon broadcast, have not yet been directly acknowledged by Burmese communist media. However, the party's PRC-based clandestine station, the Voice of the People of Burma (VOPB), has obliquely alluded to the deaths in pledging to continue armed struggle against Rangoon. A 19 March VOPB broadcast said that "serious losses within the party" are unavoidable in the course of protracted armed struggle and affirmed that the party would continue to lead the struggle in Burma "by replacing one fallen leader with another." The broadcast underlined the theme of collective leadership in declaring that the party "is not led by or built around an individual." Peking, which has supported the insurgents while maintaining relations with Rangoon, has thus far withheld all comment on the deaths.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 24 - 30 MARCH 1975

<u>Moscow (2444 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1051 items)</u>		
Upcoming V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(7%)	9%	Indochina [Cambodian Front	(16%)	17%
China	(5%)	6%	Fifth Anniversary [Vietnam	(7%)	11%
Gambia President Jawara in USSR	(3%)	4%	UN Industrial Develop- ment Organization	(1%)	2%
Congo President Ngouabi in USSR	(--)	3%	Meeting, Lima	(6%)	6%
French Prime Minister Chirac in USSR	(3%)	3%	UN Law of the Sea Con- ference	(--)	3%
			Chu Te, Chou En-lai	(--)	3%
			Congratulations to Romanian Leaders on Re-election		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues. In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.